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After highlighting the cases in which the semantics of a language cannot be
mechanically reproduced (in which case it is called inherent), the main episte-
mological consequences of the first incompleteness Theorem for the two funda-
mental arithmetical theories are shown: the non-mechanizability for the truths
of the first-order arithmetic and the peculiarities for the model of the second-
order arithmetic. Finally, the common epistemological interpretation of the
second incompleteness Theorem is corrected, proposing the new Metatheorem
of undemonstrability of internal consistency.
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1 Semantics in the Languages
Consider an arbitrary language that, as normally, makes use of a countable1 number of
characters. Combining these characters in certain ways, are formed some fundamental
strings that we call terms of the language: those collected in a dictionary. When the terms
are semantically interpreted, i. e. a certain meaning is assigned to them, we have their
distinction in adjectives, nouns, verbs, etc. Then, a proper grammar establishes the rules
of formation of sentences. While the terms are finite, the combinations of grammatically
allowed terms form an infinite-countable amount of possible sentences.
In a non-trivial language, the meaning associated to each term, and thus to each ex-
pression that contains it, is not always unique. The same sentence can enunciate different
things, so representing different propositions. For example, the same sentence “it is a plain
1Finite, as the usual alpha-numeric symbols, or, to generalize, infinite-countable. In this paper we will
use either “countable” or “enumerable” with the same meaning, i. e. to indicate that there exists a
biunivocal correspondence between the considered set and the set of the natural numbers.
1
sailing” has a different meaning depending on the circumstances: at board of a ship or
in the various cases with figurative sense. How many meanings can be associated to the
same term? That is: how many different propositions, in general, can we get by a single
sentence? The answer, for any common semantic language, may be amazing.
Suppose we assign to each term a finite number of well-defined meanings. We could
then instruct a computer to consider all the possibilities of interpretation of each term.
The computer, to simplify, may assign all the different meanings to an equal number of
distinct new terms that it has previously defined. For example, it might define the term
“f-sailing” for the figurative use of “sailing” (supposed unique). The machine would then
be able, using the grammar rules, to generate all the infinite-countable propositions. In
this case we will say that, in the specific language, the meaning has been eliminated2.
More generally we have this case when the different meanings allowed for each term are
effectively enumerable3 : even in the case of an infinite-countable amount of meanings, the
computer can define an infinite-countable number of new terms and associate only one
meaning to each term in order to establish a biunivocal correspondence between sentences
and propositions. So, the machine could list all them by combination.
Hence, by definition, we will say that a language is inherently semantic (i. e. with a non-
eliminable meaning) if it uses at least one term with an amount not effectively enumerable
of meanings; with the possibility, which we will comment soon, that this quantity is even
non-enumerable (or uncountable). From the fact that a sentence represents more than one
proposition if and only if it contains at least one term differently interpreted, it follows an
equivalent condition for the inherent semanticity: a language is inherently semantic if and
only if the set of all possible propositions is not effectively enumerable.
Now, the case of uncountable propositions is really what happens in every usual natural
language. At first, this feature might surprise or be considered unacceptable: all the
meanings that ever will be assigned to any settled word are only a countable number.
Indeed, a finite number! But these meanings cannot be specified once and for all. The
fact remains that the possible interpretations of the term vary within an infinite collection;
moreover, a collection not limited by any prefixed cardinality.
Some classic paradoxes can be interpreted as a confirmation of this property [1]. The
Richard’s one4, for example, can be interpreted as a meta-proof that the semantic defi-
nitions are not countable, i. e. that they are conceivably able to define each element of
a set with cardinality greater than the enumerable one (and therefore each real number).
The proper technique used in a diagonal Cantorian argument [2], reveals that the natural
language is able to adopt different semantic levels (or contexts), looking “after” (or from
2Just a concise choice rather than mechanically reproduced.
3A set is called effectively enumerable if there is a machine capable of producing in output all and only
its elements.
4Where firstly it is admitted that all possible semantic definitions of the real numbers stay in a countable
array and, then, one can define, by a diagonal argument [2], a real number that is not present in the
array.
the “outside”) what was “before” (or “inside”) defined; namely, what was previously said by
the same language. Identical words used in different contexts have a different meaning and
for the number of contexts, including nested, there is no limit.
On the other hand, the Berry’s paradox [1] clearly shows that a finite amount of symbols,
differently interpreted, is able to define an infinite amount of objects. Here the key of the
argument is again the use of two different contexts to interpret the verb “define”.
2 Inherent Semantics in Arithmetics
Now, on a properly mathematical context, consider the formal first-order arithmetic theory
(PA, from Peano’s Arithmetic). It is possible to prove that its propositions and theorems
are effectively enumerable [3], so PA is not inherently semantic. However, from the first
incompleteness Theorem follows that the truths of PA are not effectively enumerable. In
fact, starting by PA, supposed consistent, add as new axioms the class of all its true state-
ments. We mean: true in the intuitive (or standard) model (i. e. consistent interpretation),
formed by the spontaneous natural numbers. We have so created a new axiomatic system
(PAT ) that, by construction, is syntactically complete5: given any sentence, if it is true
is a theorem and if it is false then its negation is a theorem. Now, according to the first
incompleteness Theorem we conclude that the axioms of PAT, although enumerable, can-
not be effectively enumerable [4-6]. Therefore, for what we said, the truths of the formal
first-order arithmetic have to contain inherent semantics.
Equivalently, we can say that in the expression “true statement in the standard model”
the term true has got an amount not effectively enumerable (although enumerable) of
distinct meanings. So, the phrase belongs to an inherently semantic language.
The interesting epistemological consequence of this fact is that no machine can be pro-
grammed to get all and only the truths of the Arithmetic. In other words, these truths can
only be obtained by the use of not predetermined criteria, so clarifying, interpreting (or
inventing!) more and more unpredictable meanings for the concept of truth, in an infinite
process. We also can say that the concept of natural number, though spontaneous and
primitive, is not mechanizable: its nature is inherently semantic.
The PA theory admits an infinite amount of other interpretations besides the standard
model. The claim to build an arithmetical theory with the standard interpretation as
unique model (briefly: categorical), leads to a more general axiomatic system: the (full)
second-order arithmetic (FSOA). Here, the induction principle is extended to all the prop-
erties of the natural numbers, by a second-order6 axiom7 Since these properties, as was
5An axiomatic theory is called syntactically complete if, for any its sentence, it or its negation is a theorem.
6For definition, in a second-order syntactical expression, the existential quantifiers ∀ and ∃ can range not
only over the variable-elements, but also over variable-properties of the elements of the model. About
the dangerous confusions regarding the expressive order, see [7].
7See for example [8], where FSOA is called AR.
proved by Cantor, are uncountable [2], it is admitted that this theory can express a non-
enumerable amount of propositions. So, in particular, these are not effectively enumerable:
FSOA, unlike PA, is an inherently semantic discipline.
The categorical nature has, therefore, its price. The (unique) model of FSOA reveals
all the peculiarities of the standard, intuitive, sight of the natural numbers. Specifically,
this unique interpretation has to be able to assign more than a single meaning (indeed a
quantity at least 2ℵ0) to at least one sentence, before to verify the premises of the theory.
So, this model cannot be confused with a conventional uncountable model of a formal,
and maintained formal, axiomatic theory. This latter one, considered for example for PA,
will continue to assign only one meaning to each sentence of the system: an uncountable
amount of exceeding elements of the universe will have no representation in PA. Instead,
in the FSOA theory the unique model is, in a sense, “dynamical” and a proposition, in
general, is not fixed only by its symbolic chain. Semantics is required even to form the
propositions!
3 About an improper interpretation of the second
incompleteness Theorem
The semantical consequences of the second incompleteness Theorem are often flawed. In
reference to a theory that satisfies the same hypothesis of the first incompleteness Theorem,
the second one generalizes the undecidability to a class of statements which, interpreted in
the standard model mean “this system is consistent”. Its demonstration, only outlined by
Gödel, was published by Hilbert and Bernays in 1939.
The usual interpretation of this Theorem, object of our criticism, is that “every theory
that satisfies the hypotheses of the first incompleteness Theorem cannot prove its own
consistency”. It seems clear, in fact, that the conclusion that a theory cannot prove its
own consistency is valid for all the classical systems, including non-formal! Moreover, this
conclusion does not correspond to the second incompleteness Theorem, but to a new and
autonomous metatheorem.
Consider an arbitrary classical axiomatic system. If it is inconsistent, it is deprived of
models and therefore of any reasonable interpretation of any statement8. Therefore, only
the admitting that a given statement of the theory means something, implies agreeing
consistency. And indubitably this also applies if the interpretation of the statement is “this
system is consistent”.
So, if there is no assurance about the consistency of the theory (which, to want to
dig deep enough, applies to any mathematical discipline) we cannot be certain on any
interpretation of its language. For example, in the case of the usual Geometry, when we
prove the pythagorean Theorem, what we really conclude is “if the system supports the
Euclidean model (and therefore is consistent), then in every rectangle triangle c1
2+c2
2=I2”.
8More in depth: of any interpretation respecting the principles of contradiction and excluded third.
Certainly, a deduction with an undeniable epistemological worth, still in the catastrophic
possibility of inconsistence.
But now let’s see what happens if a certain theorem of a certain theory is interpreted with
the meaning: “this system is consistent” in a given interpretation M. Similarly, what we
can conclude by this theorem is really: “if this system supports the model M (and therefore
is consistent), then it is consistent”. Something that we already knew and, above all, that
does not demonstrate at all the consistency of the system9. Unlike any other statement
with a different meaning in M, for this kind of statement we have a peculiar situation:
bothering to prove it within the theory is epistemologically irrelevant in the ambit of the
interpretation M. In more simple words, the statement in question can be a theorem or be
undecidable with no difference for the epistemological view. Just it cannot be the denial of
a theorem, if M is really a model. So, in any case, the problem of deducing the consistency
of the theory is beyond the reach of the theory itself. We propose to call Metatheorem of
undemonstrability internal of consistency this totally general metamathematic conclusion.
Then, the fact that in a particular and hypothetically consistent theory, such a statement
is a theorem or is undecidable, is depending on the system and on the specific form of the
statement. For theories that satisfy the assumptions of the first one, the second incomplete-
ness Theorem guarantees that “normally” these statements are undecidable. “Normally”
just means “in the standard interpretation”: in fact the Theorem does not forbid that
statements expressing consistency of the system in different models could be theorems10.
As Lolli says, “it seems that not even a proof shuts discussions” [11]. But in no case this
debate can affect the validity of the proposed Metatheorem.
Summarizing, the second incompleteness Theorem identifies another class of essentially
undecidable statements for any theory that satisfies the hypothesis of the first one. Whilst
the first incompleteness Theorem determines only the Gödel’s statement, the second one
extends the undecidability to a much broader category of propositions. But, contrary
to what is commonly believed, this drastic generalization does not introduce any new
and dramatic epistemological concept about the consistency of the system. It doesn’t
so, even if the Theorem were valid for every statement interpretable as “this system is
consistent” (which, we reaffirm, seems to be false). Because by it in no case we can
conclude that “the system cannot prove its own consistency”: this judgment belongs to a
different and completely general Metatheorem which seems never have been stated, despite
its obviousness and undeniability11 .
Finally we emphasize that the meta-demonstration of the proposed Metatheorem, since
9Just remember that in case of inconsistency we have that every proposition is a theorem!
10Indeed, it seems that these statements really exist [9-10].
11 The consistency of a theory may be demonstrated only outside the same, by another external system.
For which, in turn, the problem of consistency arises again. To get out of this endless chain, the “last”
conclusion of consistency has to be purely metamathematic. Actually, the most general theory (that
demonstrates the consistency of the ordinary mathematic disciplines) is the formal Set Theory and the
conclusion of its consistency only consists in a “reasonable conviction”.
refers to any arbitrary classical system, must consist in a purely meta-mathematical rea-
soning (like that one we have presented): it cannot be formalized.
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